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ABSTRACT 
 
Shared services are a popular reform for governments under financial pressure.  The 
hope is to reduce overheads and increase efficiency by providing support services 
like HR, finance and procurement once to multiple agencies.  Drawing on insights 
from organization theory and political science, we identify five risks that shared 
services won’t live up to current expectations.  We illustrate each with empirical 
evidence from the UK, Ireland and further afield, and conclude with suggestions on 
how to manage these risks. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Efficiency pressures in the public sector have intensified since the global 
financial crisis.  Declining budgets and rising demand for public services mean that 
governments are looking for significant cost savings through re-organization.  One 
solution that is proving especially popular is ‘shared services’ (MacCarthaigh, 2014; 
Boon & Verhoest, 2015; Raudla & Tammel, 2015).  Widely favoured in the private 
sector, this reform removes an organization’s administrative and/or professional 
support functions to a specialist provider, who then offers the same services to 
multiple clients (Ulrich, 1995; Bergeron, 2003).  The aim is to reduce duplication in 
areas like HR, finance and procurement, harness economies of scale, and promote 
investment and professionalization.  This should deliver corporate support that is 
both higher quality and significantly cheaper. 
Despite some noteworthy successes and widespread enthusiasm among 
consultants and policy institutes (PWC, 2009; LGA, 2012; AGA & Accenture, 2015; 
OECD, 2015; Shared Services Leadership Coalition, 2015), it is increasingly apparent 
that shared services are no fail-safe efficiency solution.  Delays, cost overruns and 
deteriorating service quality are commonplace (NAO, 2008, 2011; Economic 
Regulation Authority, 2011; Chesterman, 2013), and disillusionment is beginning to 
set in.  Peter Gershon, the British businessman and government adviser who initially 
recommended shared services in 2004, later conceded that difficulties in 
implementation mean the reform “should only be undertaken on a very carefully 
selected and controlled basis” (Gershon, 2008).  Problems have also occurred in 
Belgium, the Netherlands and Estonia (Wagenaar, 2006; Boon & Verhoest, 2015; 
Raudla & Tammel, 2015), and the Australian Government recently cautioned that: 
“There are plenty of examples … where a good idea that is not well implemented 
leads to increased costs and/or poorer service standards” (Australian Public Service 
Commission, 2013, p.7). Even in the private sector, 60% of shared services projects 
reportedly fall behind their original business case (Briskman, 2015). 
Given these problems, this article re-examines the cost-saving potential of 
shared services for governments under financial pressure.  Our inspiration comes 
from organization theory and political science – perspectives largely absent from 
existing literature.  After a brief account of the reform idea and its growing 
4   
popularity, we identify five risks that savings won’t be realized.  We illustrate each 
with evidence from the UK, Ireland and further afield, and conclude with 
recommendations on how to manage these risks. 
SHARED SERVICES IN GOVERNMENT 
What are shared services? 
There are certain administrative and professional functions that most 
organizations perform, irrespective of their primary objectives.  These support the 
enterprise to deliver its goals and meet regulatory requirements – for example, by 
recruiting personnel, purchasing goods and services, or providing analysis and 
advice (Huijben et al., 2013).  Finance, procurement, human resources, information 
technology, estates, legal services and internal audit are examples of these 
‘corporate services’.  Some functions are fairly standardized (like payroll), while 
others require customization.  Yet overlap is sufficient to ask whether this activity is 
best performed in-house or whether it can be consolidated between multiple 
organizations (Elston, 2015). 
This question has long exercised administrative scientists, who find trade-
offs between in-house and “common” services (Gulick, 1937).  Internalization means 
that a single line of authority directs all the resources upon which the organization 
depends.  Services can be designed for specific purposes, delivered to individual 
timetables, and resourced according to immediate priorities.  But in-house 
production is often more expensive, with lower volumes of activity bringing higher 
unit costs and prohibiting strategic investment.  Alternatively, the higher workload 
achieved when organizations share support services often brings lower unit costs, 
better use of technology and greater expertise, albeit at the expense of some 
responsiveness and customization.  
Given these trade-offs, historically, governments and industry alike have 
cycled between alternative corporate service arrangements.  The advent of M-form 
companies in the 1960s-70s relaxed the administrative centralization of previously 
favoured U-forms (Williamson, 1985), while decentralization during the 1980s-90s 
undid many common services in public bureaucracies (Barzelay, 1992).  Current 
enthusiasm for shared services thus represents a further oscillation of this 
de/centralisation cycle, though today’s reformers opine that ICT and quasi-
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marketization (pay-per-use charging, customer choice) differentiate shared services 
from prior models (Ulrich, 1995; Bergeron, 2003).   
Figure 1 compares four arrangements for corporate support.  Models (ii)-(iv) 
involve some inter-organizational sharing, but differ by how many clients are 
served, their proximity to the vendor, and whether the private sector is involved.  
Further variation comes from whether high-volume transactional functions 
(invoicing, vacancy listing) or high-skill professional services (legal advice) are 
consolidated; how the different parties interact (informal negotiation, service level 
agreements, contracts); and how clients are related to one another (geographically, 
by policy sector, or not at all).  More research is needed into how these attributes 
correlate, but implementation style appears relevant (Raudla & Tammel, 2015).  
Shared services can be imposed on agencies by higher authorities, or can emerge 
voluntarily (see OECD, 2015).  The bottom-up approach tends to favour small-scale 
joint ventures, whereas top-down implementation allows larger-scale insourcing or 
coordinated outsourcing. 
 
>>>FIGURE<<< 
 
Where, when and how? 
The shared services terminology emerged in the private sector during the 
1980s, initially for treasury and accounting.  In government, it first appeared at 
state-level in Australia and Canada in the 1990s (Juozapavicius, 2000).  These 
reforms expanded after 2000, and found favour elsewhere, including in public 
healthcare in the UK and New Zealand (Day & Norris, 2006; Redman et al., 2007), 
and local government in Germany (Niehaves & Krause, 2010).  Interest also grew at 
the national level, starting with information systems in America (GAO, 2006) but 
soon expanding into other functions in a variety of countries.   
The 2007-08 global financial crisis gave new impetus, prompting more 
urgent and ambitious reforms in many local, regional and national governments 
around the world.  Table 1 describes some recent initiatives, illustrating the 
widespread appeal and varied implementation of the shared services concept.  It 
includes single-sector consolidations in British Columbia and the Netherlands, 
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alongside cross-sector schemes in Sweden and Denmark.  Some vendors provide 
only one function, as in Canada, whereas others are multifunctional.  Funding 
mechanisms vary, but governance tends towards the (ii) joint venture and (iii) 
insourcing types, although there are other examples of public-private partnering 
and full outsourcing (see McIvor et al., 2011). 
 
>>>TABLE<<< 
 
Why shared services? 
Despite the variety of reforms in Table 1, there is general agreement on the 
intended benefits.  These include greater management focus on primary objectives, 
increased customer satisfaction, and better career prospects for specialist staff.  
Yet, the most prominent rationale is cost reduction.  Expected savings vary, but 
claims of 25-45 per cent are common (Accenture, 2005; Shared Services Leadership 
Coalition, 2015).  Thus, up to £8bn is reportedly available from reform in the UK 
(PWC, 2009), and $47bn from US federal government (AGA & Accenture, 2015).  
Most savings derive from the aggregation of workload.  Higher volumes allow a 
finer ‘division of labour,’ enhancing productivity.  Consolidation also allows better 
handling of fluctuating demand, ensuring staff and infrastructure are never 
underutilized.  And investment thresholds are lower when organizations work in 
partnership, allowing greater access to automation or professional expertise (see 
Murray et al., 2008).  Additionally, consolidation might reduce client demand on 
support services through improved management information, and can bring 
additional revenue if services are sold to third parties (see LGA, 2012). 
Given these promises, governments are under growing pressure to adopt 
some sort of shared services programme.  In 2005, one consultant urged public 
managers: “If you are not already thinking about moving to shared services for your 
organisation, you probably should be” (Accenture, 2005, p.36).  Since then, budget 
cuts have only increased this imperative, as spending is prioritized on frontline 
public services.  However, the benefits of reform are proving hard to realize in 
practice.  Projects in the UK transport and research funding sectors exceeded their 
start-up budgets by 105% (£58m) and 65% (£51m), respectively (NAO, 2008, 2011).  
Difficulties in the Netherlands, Queensland and Western Australia led to 
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programmes being cancelled midway through implementation (Wagenaar, 2006; 
Economic Regulation Authority, 2011; Chesterman, 2013).  In New South Wales, 
initially, only 5% of expected savings were realized (Dollery & Grant, 2009, p.45).  
And a recent survey of US public agencies found nearly half failed to achieve any 
savings, with a quarter actually reporting cost increases (Schwarz, 2014, pp.191-
192). 
Research has begun to explore these problems in general terms (Borman & 
Janssen, 2013; Knol et al., 2014), but as yet there is no explanation for why cost 
saving specifically can go so awry.  Consequently, below we look to political science 
and organization theory to identify five key risks: escalating start-up costs, 
increased transaction costs, reduced service quality, functional duplication and 
opportunity costs.  We illustrate each with interview data and published audits from 
the UK and Ireland, which are undergoing major reforms (DPER, 2011; HM 
Government, 2012), as well as with secondary literature from further afield.  
Interviews were part of separate research projects examining recent trends in 
administrative reform.  
 
FIVE RISKS TO COST SAVING THROUGH SHARED SERVICES 
1. Escalating start-up costs due to path dependence 
Beginning with reform development, while there are cases of shared services 
being delivered on time and budget (LGA, 2012; Controller and Auditor-General, 
2014), often there are delays and significant cost overruns (NAO, 2008, 2011; 
Economic Regulation Authority, 2011; Chesterman, 2013; NIAO, 2013).  This reflects 
the difficulty of refashioning organizations to enable service sharing.  Change 
resistance has long been observed in bureaucracies (Downs, 1966; Hannan & 
Freeman, 1984).  Emotional attachments, cognitive biases and internal politics 
partly explain such inertia (see Sydow et al., 2009, pp.693-694), and certainly 
account for some problems with shared services, for which staff resistance is widely 
reported (GAO, 2006; McIvor, et al., 2011; Boon & Verhoest, 2015).  Yet there are 
many other reasons for organizational ‘lock-in’ which might explain the reported 
difficulties.  One is path dependence. 
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Path dependence occurs when “each step along a particular path produces 
consequences which make that path more attractive” (Pierson, 2000, pp.253, 252).  
Various self-reinforcing mechanisms gradually affect the balance of choice between 
continuity and change, increasing “the costs of exit – of switching to some 
previously plausible alternative.”  These mechanisms include: high start-up and fixed 
costs, which commit organizations to amortizing an initial investment over time; 
interdependencies between systems, which produce a ‘drag’ on changing any single 
element; and learning effects, where familiarity (not change) increases productivity 
(Pierson, 2000; Sydow, et al., 2009).  Together, these forces “render a system 
potentially inefficient, because it loses its capacity to adopt better alternatives” 
(Sydow, et al., 2009, p.692). 
Path dependence explains cost overruns in shared service projects by the 
unexpected difficulties of breaking these self-reinforcing mechanisms.  Firstly, in 
terms of fixed and start-up costs, as Downs (1966, p.195) explains: “established 
processes [in organizations] represent an enormous previous investment in time, 
effort, and money.”  Sometimes, the price of foregoing this prior investment is 
obvious, as when shared services bring staff redundancies (NAO, 2008) or penalties 
for leaving existing contracts early (Hall, 2014).  But often costs are hidden; for 
instance, when abandoning existing technology that has yet to run its full economic 
life.  Such an unnecessary reduction in the value-for-money of prior investments 
must be carefully weighed against the benefits of changing path, and might bias 
decision-makers towards the status quo. 
Secondly, unforeseen or underestimated interdependencies between back-
office and frontline systems can increase start-up costs for shared services.  This has 
been a recurrent issue in US federal government (GAO, 2006), and also caused 
significant problems in the UK transport sector, where it was only latterly realized 
that technology developed for a new shared services platform also needed to align 
with cross-governmental security regulations (NAO, 2008).   
Finally, in terms of learning effects that create path dependency, it takes 
time for a new system’s capabilities, quirks and dysfunctions to be observed and 
accommodated by staff operatives.  This causes an initial dip in productivity, as 
reported in both the Netherlands and Western Australia when new “self-service” 
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portals required untrained staff to process their own HR transactions online 
(Economic Regulation Authority, 2011; Meijerink & Bondarouk, 2013).   
 The cost of breaking these three self-reinforcing mechanisms are often 
underestimated.  In extreme cases, so great do the difficulties turn out to be that, 
were they recognized from the start, the reforms might never have been approved.  
For example, shared services in Western Australia cost $362mAUD more than 
planned, and in hindsight should never have proceeded (Economic Regulation 
Authority, 2011).  As one of our Irish interviewees summarized:  
“Shared services is a very good idea on paper, and a very difficult … product to put into 
place. … [Y]ou’ve got to put a huge effort into it.  Sometimes…the effort would be far 
greater…than actually the result you would deliver…”  
2. Increased transaction costs 
In economic terms, organizations incur both production costs and 
transaction costs.  These represent the price of turning inputs into outputs, and of 
arranging and monitoring those processes.  Both costs should be minimized, but 
often there is a trade-off.  Externalization lowers production costs for standard 
items due to scale economies, but can bring higher transaction costs than if 
managers oversee the work directly (Williamson, 1985).  As Coase (1960, p.15) 
explains: 
“In order to carry out a market transaction it is necessary to discover who it is that one 
wishes to deal with, to inform people that one wishes to deal and on what terms, to conduct 
negotiations leading up to a bargain, to draw up the contract, to undertake the inspection 
needed to make sure that the terms of the contract are being observed, and so on.  These 
operations are often extremely costly....” 
Thus, in order to achieve a net efficiency gain from sharing corporate services, 
production-cost savings must outweigh any increase in transaction costs. 
Shared services involve various transaction costs.  Initially, great effort might 
be needed to document how the back-office currently operates.  As Cohen et al. 
(1976, p.25) explain, often an organization’s “own processes are not understood by 
its members.  It operates on the basis of simple trial and error procedures, the 
residue of learning from the accidents of past experience, and pragmatic inventions 
of necessity.”  Codifying such a haphazard system is essential if it is to be delegated 
to a third party, but this task is costly and liable to be rushed.  For instance, in New 
Zealand’s recent reforms, “the most significant problem … was a lack of 
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thoroughness in gathering information … for working out what [the vendor] needed 
to include in its scope” (Controller and Auditor-General, 2014, p.18).  Similarly, 
limited understanding of internal processes led to unforeseen interdependencies in 
Sweden (Ulbrich, 2006, p.200), and to poorly-specified (and expensive) ICT 
contracts in several UK cases (NAO, 2008, 2011).   
Transaction costs also arise when client organizations attempt to 
standardize their back-office processes – a necessity for unit cost savings.  As the 
research literature on inter-organizational collaboration reveals, it is often difficult 
and time consuming to reach agreement between multiple independent parties, 
and can involve considerable “process” costs (McGuire and Agranoff, 2011).  As a 
shared services employee in the NHS reported: “[Different clients] all want different 
things and you get caught in the middle. … They are all pulling in different 
directions” (see Redman, et al., 2007, p.1500).   Moreover, if unresolved, such 
disagreements can result in excessive customization of services, lowering 
production-costs savings.  This problem has been widely reported. 
A third source of transaction costs is the increased coordinative burden when 
functions are split between vendors and clients.  As Fraser (1954, pp.256-257) 
explained of the UK’s old “common service” arrangements from the 1950s: 
"There is … a new labour for top management … of coordinating the work of the common 
service with that of the executive lines which it serves.  There is the additional labour of 
explaining to the common service what is required....  There is … some waste work because 
of misunderstanding.  There is also more to-and-fro, more paper and records of all sorts, 
more talk and more meetings and more committees.” 
Although new technologies might lessen this burden somewhat, recent research in 
Estonia still found that shared services required “several additional organizational 
levels … [in] the coordination processes” (Raudla & Tammel, 2015, p.172).  
Overall, the economic perspective reveals that administrative consolidation 
is not necessarily efficient.  It depends on the balance of production costs and 
transaction costs.  Reform proponents often overlook this trade-off, focusing on 
unit-cost savings rather than the transaction-cost burden for clients – a practice 
recently condemned by several government auditors (Economic Regulation 
Authority, 2011; Office of the Auditor General of Canada, 2015).  Likewise, some of 
our interviewees complained about poor recognition of client costs: 
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“For a department of [large] size, we actually had a very lean HR division per head of staff, 
so we had a cheap enough system.   So, in migrating [to a shared service], we were going to 
a more expensive system...” 
 “[T]he department wants you to go onto their shared services, but what happens if it 
actually costs you more?  ’Cause we’re in the position where, actually, to move over to some 
of the shared services … would cost us more than the way we’re doing things at the 
moment.” 
 
3. Reduced service quality 
Inter-agency standardization of back-office processes, which is required to 
achieve unit-cost savings, is enforced through rules and regulations.  This aids 
coordination, but, according to organizational sociology, also bring several risks, 
including excessive concern for processes over outcomes, slower decision-making 
and decreased innovation (Merton, 1952; Thompson, 1965; Downs, 1966) – all of 
which can damage service quality and inflate costs. 
“Goal displacement” occurs in organizations when “adherence to the rules, 
originally conceived as a means, becomes transformed into an end-in-itself” 
(Merton, 1952, p.365).  This is a familiar criticism of public bureaucracies generally, 
inspiring many administrative reforms in the 1980s-90s (Barzelay, 1992).  Although 
contemporary shared services enthusiasts acknowledge the need for vendors to 
remain responsive to clients – as Ulrich (1995) writes, “the user is the chooser” – this 
remains difficult in practice, as one UK interviewee explained: 
“[When you have] a great big, monolithic, potentially-monopsonistic supplier … then you 
start getting Shared Services and Procurement having policies and ideas of their own, and 
their idea about what your business should be.  And [they] stop acting like the provider, and 
start acting like the customer.” 
The official proceeded to recall such an incident of the “tail wagging the dog,” 
where the vendor’s concern for adhering to processes undermined the client’s focus 
on policy outcomes.  As they vented: “Why are we here in government: to provide 
prisons and courts and hospitals, or to provide procurement?”  
Regulation is also associated with slower organizational decision-making for 
non-routine matters, which must be referred up the hierarchy before a new rule can 
be made (Downs, 1966).  Historically, Fraser (1954, p.257) warned that “Common 
services slow down the passage of business.”  Again, despite technological 
advancements, this remains a concern today, with a senior UK official remarking: 
12   
“It’s a difficult journey to get to a place where a shared service model … isn't a brake 
on the business.”   
Finally, heavily regulated organizations have also been associated with 
reduced innovation, the detailed specification of resources and procedures 
dampening creativity (Thompson, 1965).  This concern was implicit in one UK 
interviewee’s account of the irony of working in a semi-independent public agency 
that was nonetheless forced to adopt shared services: 
“Shared services – that's where the departmental mandate comes out.  … You know: 
‘Agencies – yes, you're free to deliver [as you want], but you'll use this IT, you'll use that HR, 
you'll use that procurement...’”  
Together, goal displacement, slower decision-making and dampened 
innovation not only damage service quality, but also have cost implications – for 
example, if vendor mistakes have to be corrected or client organizations start 
duplicating poorly-performing functions in-house (see Risk 4, below). 
 
4. Functional duplication  
 Sharing services should eliminate duplicated activity, over-capacity and 
‘redundancies’ in public agencies.  However, the emergence of shadow teams in 
client organizations, repeating the work of vendors, is a well-known post-
consolidation risk to efficiency (Ulrich, 1995, p.23), lowering the volume of shared 
transactions and undermining scale economies.   
There are many possible explanations for continued duplication of functions 
after the adoption of shared services.  Some theorists argue that bureaucrats 
naturally prefer autonomy and seek to maximize this whenever possible (Downs, 
1966).  This perspective is implicit in existing discussions of agency resistance to 
shared services (McIvor, et al., 2011; Boon & Verhoest, 2015).  A more nuanced 
account is that officials value prestigious policy work rather than mundane 
operations (Dunleavy, 1991).  This suggests that high-skill professional services, 
rather than high-volume administrative processing, is more likely to be duplicated 
in-house (although as yet there is no research evidence for this). 
An alternative explanation comes from institutional theory.  Since at least 
the 1970s, it has been recognized that organizations gain legitimacy by adhering to 
dominant societal beliefs about what  ‘good management’ looks like (Meyer & 
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Rowan, 1977).  But these cultural scripts often conflict with the demands of internal 
efficiency.  Consequently, organizations might ‘decouple’ their public-facing 
exterior from their internal operations, operating differently in public than in private 
(Elston 2016).  This means paying lip service to fashionable reforms, such as shared 
services, while retaining (and concealing) in-house capacity, if this is thought 
beneficial to day-to-day management.  There is some evidence to support this 
institutional explanation for shadow teams emerging after shared service adoption.  
In Estonia, amid strong pressure for reform, client agencies created “‘parallel’ 
accounting systems which served their own special purposes and informational 
needs better [than the vendor]” (Raudla & Tammel, 2015, p.172).  Similarly, in the 
UK, fear about sharing the internal audit and assurance function between 
organizations brought the risk of concealed duplication, as one interviewee 
remarked:  
“If you start to do things like that, then, at worst what’ll happen is an Accounting Officer will 
think ‘Oh well, they can do what they like, but I'm gonna have my own internal audit, and I'll 
call it something else’ – and that defeats the object of the exercise, really.  [The Accounting 
Office will] probably be getting his internal auditors to look at what really matters to him, 
and fobbing the other one off with anything else...” 
 A third explanation for duplication is that, despite conventional wisdom, 
organizational redundancies can actually be efficient if they increase system 
reliability and resilience (Landau, 1969; Lerner, 1986).  As Lerner (1986, p.335) 
explains, “Without duplication, the breakdown of one organizational channel leaves 
no other duplicate channel available for backup.”  Thus, shadow teams might 
emerge as a fail-safe.  For example, a survey of finance officials in Northern Ireland 
found the majority were supplementing shared accounting services in order to 
“double-check” the vendor’s work (NIAO, 2013, pp.41, 52).  This partly explains why 
staff savings were less than expected. 
 
5. Opportunity costs 
Finally, as with any reform, there are opportunity costs to adopting shared 
services – especially in the current fiscal climate.  Human and financial resources are 
limited, and leaders face choices and forego alternatives when one reform option is 
selected over another.  So the question arises: by focusing particularly on shared 
14   
services, what are governments not doing, and is this sacrifice worthwhile from a 
cost-saving perspective?   
Shared services might indeed enable economies of scale, scope and learning; 
but there is also much to be gained by the reverse strategy of devolving decisions 
and resources to individual agencies.  This approach, which was favored in the 1980s 
and 1990s, brings its own challenges in coordination and control, but it does reduce 
the bureaucratic burden on the frontline and potentially increase agility and 
innovation.  These can contribute to cost saving, but are difficult to achieve when 
the main thrust of reform is centralization. 
Furthermore, the major restructuring required for shared services might 
distract from the underlying aim of streamlining complex back-office processes, or 
might divert attention away from the much greater challenge of reshaping frontline 
systems and processes (which, after all, is where the majority of public money is 
spent).  This is not to suggest that administrative cost-saving is not possible or 
desirable, but that less resource-intensive alternatives to full shared services might 
be more productive overall if they free up capacity for other reforms to be pursued 
simultaneously. 
 
CONCLUSIONS  
There is no denying that shared services have recently found widespread 
favour in governments around the world, albeit with great variation in scale and 
style.  In current circumstances, the promise of major efficiency gains is extremely 
attractive.  But faced with a series of disappointments, this article has re-examined 
the cost-saving potential of shared services, drawing on hitherto underused ideas 
from organization theory and political science. 
Our findings essay a distinctly cautionary message.  Although the difficulties 
of implementation are increasingly recognized, few commentators have questioned 
the “tremendous theoretical potential” for shared services to deliver savings to 
cash-strapped organizations (Ulbrich, 2006, p.196).  As Briskman (2015) urges, “The 
business case … often writes itself.”  Yet we have illustrated a range of possible side-
effects – from increased transaction costs, to goal displacement and the loss of fail-
safe redundancies – that might actually damage organizational efficiency, long after 
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the initial restructuring is over.  And this list is not exhaustive.  We might also have 
mentioned the risk of becoming locked-in to inflexible contracts (McIvor, et al., 
2011), or the difficulty of retaining sufficient in-house expertise to be an “intelligent 
customer” of the vendor (Bovaird, 2016).  Of course, these are all only potential side-
effects – or risk factors.  Their incidence no doubt varies by context, and an 
important question for future research is to explain this variation.  Why do some 
shared service reforms work better than others?  Nonetheless, on the basis of the 
above, we must refute the popular suggestion that shared services are inherently a 
superior method of delivering corporate support to organizations.  Rather, following 
the “contingency” view of organizations, which emphasizes the role of context in 
determining effective organisational design (Donaldson, 2001), it seems that 
multiple factors must be carefully weighed before shared services can be judged 
appropriate for a particular set of circumstances. 
In conclusion, we offer the following advice to practitioners and a final note 
about future research in this area. 
 
Policy implications 
1) Explore all options.  Shared services should be evaluated as one of a 
range of options for improving administrative efficiency.  Sometimes they will be 
the best choice.  Sometimes they will not, with reforms to in-house provision 
preferable.  This is especially likely if transaction costs are high or clients have 
diverse needs.  And sometimes, key benefits like streamlined processes and joint 
acquisition of technology might be achieved without full structural aggregation, 
with all its attendant challenges.  Indeed, the UK’s National Audit Office (2012, p.26) 
recently cast a rather damning verdict on shared services by arguing that “many of 
the benefits generated [so far] could have been achieved by other means or with 
lower investment.”   
 2) Confront the trade-offs.  Rarely does organizational change deliver all 
benefit for no cost, no matter how the reform is “sold” to key stakeholders.  As 
noted, there are often trade-offs between production and transaction costs, and 
between inefficient and fail-safe redundancies.  Explicitly recognizing these 
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dilemmas will improve initial cost-benefit analysis and indicate areas for subsequent 
risk monitoring and management. 
3) Use ‘negative’ feedback.  Often, staff resistance to shared services is 
interpreted as unhelpful bureaucratic obstinacy.  This is simplistic.  Self-interest is 
indeed one explanation, but there are many other causes of reluctance that reflect 
genuine problems with the shared services idea.  Hence, negative feedback is not 
simply a “people issue” to be dealt with by appropriate change management, but is 
also an opportunity to engage end-users in reform design and implementation.  For 
instance, clients can highlight where costs are being transferred from vendors to 
users, rather than fully eliminated (Office of the Auditor General of Canada, 2015).  
 
Note for research 
 Finally, given current fiscal pressures around the world, it is important that 
shared services receive further research attention over the coming years.  One 
lesson from this article is that, despite frequent claims of newness, inter-
organizational corporate services are really an old invention that has gone through 
phases of popularity and decline in both government and industry.  Whether new 
technologies or quasi-marketization help to overcome previous difficulties with the 
common services idea is not a matter to be taken for granted, but an important 
research question to be tested empirically.  Indeed, by recognizing this lineage, and 
the cyclical pressures that prompt consolidation and fragmentation in 
organizations, we can begin to provide suitable advice to public managers on how 
to sort out the reasonable from the outlandish claims currently being made about 
the benefits of sharing services. 
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Country Example 
(Year created) 
Scale Scope Governance 
New Zealand Central Agencies 
Shared Services 
(2012) 
Vendor: 91staff 
Clients: 3 
departments in 
the core 
executive, 
700staff 
Finance, 
information 
management, ICT, 
HR  
Business unit of 
Treasury  
Co-governed by 
clients 
Canada Shared Services 
Canada (2011) 
Vendor: 
6,000staff 
Clients: 43 
organisations 
across the 
federal 
government 
Mandatory and 
optional ICT 
Separate 
government 
department 
Shares a 
government 
minister, with 
clients on 
departmental 
boards 
Pay-per-use 
funding 
Health Shared 
Services BC (2010) 
Vendor: 
1,500staff 
Clients: 7 health 
authorities in 
British Columbia 
Accounts 
Receivable, 
Employee Records 
& Benefits, Payroll, 
Supply Chain, ICT. 
Hosted by one 
health authority 
Management 
board includes 
CEOs of client 
organisations 
Co-funded by 
clients, with 
savings returned 
to them  
Australia Shared Services 
Centre (2014) 
Vendor: 600staff 
Clients: 32 
organisations in 
federal 
government 
Optional payroll, 
financial 
processing, ICT, 
communications, 
estates. 
Started by the 
Departments of 
Education and 
Employment 
Pay-per-use 
funding 
Shared Services 
SA (2010) 
Vendor: 819staff 
Clients: 
organisations in 
Southern 
Australia 
Payroll and financial 
services; ICT 
recently devolved 
back to clients 
Business unit of 
Department of 
the Premier and 
Cabinet 
Shares a 
government 
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minister 
Grant funded 
Sweden Statens 
servicecenter 
(2012) 
Vendor: 340staff 
Clients: 
70,600staff 
Payroll, finance, 
procurement 
Separate 
government 
agency 
Pay-per-use 
funding 
Denmark Statens 
Administration 
(2011) 
 
Vendor: 350staff 
Clients: 160 
organisations 
across national 
government 
Payroll, financial 
services 
Separate 
government 
agency 
Grant funded 
The 
Netherlands 
Police Service 
Centre (2011) 
Vendor: 
6,200staff 
Clients: regional 
police forces, 
64,000staff 
Payroll, ICT, 
procurement, 
estates 
Grant funded 
 
